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Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation on the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf in the Aftermath 
of the Macondo Disaster 
John Paterson 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the United 
Kingdom’s approach to the regulation of offshore occupational health and 
safety, on the one hand, and to environmental protection, on the other, had 
evolved considerably over its forty-five year history. In regard to health 
and safety, an essentially self-regulatory approach gave way to detailed 
prescriptive regulation. This transformation occurred in response to the 
Sea Gem disaster in 1965, but it was subsequently supplanted by the 
current goal-setting and safety case regime established in the aftermath of 
the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster. Concurrently, driven in no small measure 
by the United Kingdom’s international—especially European—
obligations, environmental regulation had expanded, to the point that, by 
2010, every aspect of offshore operations was subject to multiple pieces 
of environmental legislation. In many respects, it was unforeseeable that 
an accident occurring in another jurisdiction, especially one governed by 
different regulatory approaches, would have produced any significant 
impact on the United Kingdom’s arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the Macondo disaster’s effects on the British regulatory 
scheme continue to be felt in the United Kingdom some five years after 
the accident. Significantly, however, the most important of these effects 
have not come directly to the United Kingdom, but rather were transmitted 
via the European Union. Furthermore, the latest developments are 
impacting the United Kingdom’s offshore occupational health and safety 
regime, which had previously been relatively self-contained in comparison 
to that of the European Union, where regulation of the offshore industry 
was principally tied to environmental regulation. The question, therefore, 
arises as to whether such change is wholly coherent with the existing 
British system, or whether it introduces a potentially destabilizing 
inconsistency. In other words, have the institutions of the European Union 
unnecessarily complicated the United Kingdom’s arrangements with their 
attempts to minimize the risks of a Macondo-style disaster in European 
waters? Conversely, where the European Union has followed the United 
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Kingdom’s approach to intervention, has it inadvertently compelled wider 
adoption among other Member States of a regulatory approach that 
remains questionable in many aspects? 
Answering these already complex inquiries requires consideration of 
two other issues that have arisen since 2010. The first questions the 
influence of other institutional reforms underway in the United Kingdom 
as a result of the previous regime’s concern over the effects of the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf’s (UKCS) maturity as a hydrocarbon 
province, specifically related to the maximum economic recovery of oil 
and gas. The second raises the more current issue of the significant 
reduction in the price of oil and the expectation that the recent levels—
even as of the summer of 2014—will not be achieved again in the 
foreseeable future. 
Part I of this article considers the United Kingdom’s own post-
Macondo parliamentary and independent reviews of its regulatory regime 
for occupational health and safety and environmental protection. Part II 
moves on to assess the European Union’s interventions. Conclusions are 
then drawn, suggesting that while the United Kingdom’s regulatory 
arrangements will not likely be threatened by the actions of the European 
Union, the transposing of United Kingdom models on other less developed 
regions of the OCS could prove problematic. 
I. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REVIEW OF ITS HEALTH, SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
The scale of the Macondo disaster, both in terms of lives lost and in 
terms of the amount of oil spilled, could not be easily ignored by any state 
involved in offshore oil and gas production. Thus, even if the United 
Kingdom felt that it had relatively advanced and sophisticated regimes for 
the regulation of occupational health and safety and the regulation of 
environmental protection, it nevertheless had no interest in appearing 
complacent or suggesting that there were no lessons to learn from such an 
unprecedented event. In any case, the fact that the United States had 
already announced a moratorium on deepwater drilling—and the 
European Union Commissioner for Energy had called on Member States 
to do the same—made it imperative that the United Kingdom either follow 
suit or demonstrate clearly that such action was unnecessary. 
The Parliamentary Select Committee for Energy and Climate Change 
(Select Committee) announced an inquiry on July 20, 2010, “to examine 
the safety and environmental regulations of oil and gas operations on the 
UKCS—especially in the deepwater to be found in the region West of 
Shetland—and the potential positive and negative impacts of a 




moratorium on deepwater drilling.”1 The Select Committee sought 
evidence on, inter alia, “the extent to which the existing British safety and 
environmental regulatory regime is fit for purpose.”2 The implicated 
government departments and agencies—the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and the 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)—converged to deliver a unified 
response to this call. They took a position that attempted to strike a 
balance—on the one hand claiming that “[o]ur regulatory regime is 
already among the most robust in the world and the industry’s track record 
in the North Sea is strong,” whilst on the other acknowledging that “we 
must learn everything we can from the Macondo well.”3 The 
Memorandum submitted by the three bodies set out their respective roles 
and responsibilities as they were established following the Piper Alpha 
disaster in July 1988, when 167 men were killed in the destruction caused 
by an explosion and fire on a major North Sea production platform. The 
HSE was responsible for assessing and regulating “the integrity and safety 
of offshore installations in the [United Kingdom]” under the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, particularly the goal- setting and safety case 
regulations which were introduced following the inquiry into the disaster, 
led by Lord Cullen, a senior Scottish judge.4 DECC was responsible for 
licensing and environmental regulation offshore, which included the duty 
to approve Oil Pollution Emergency Plans. The MCA was responsible, “if 
required, for deploying any counter pollution measures to minimise a 
pollution incident.”5 The Memorandum noted that a variety of 
international initiatives designed to learn the lessons of Macondo were 
already under way, and, while it outlined the United Kingdom’s 
engagement with all of these, it also stressed the need to ensure that any 
proposed changes: 
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are based on robust evidence; are proportionate and risk 
assessment based; avoid disruption to existing mature regulatory 
regimes (such as the UK’s) that have proven to be effective over 
time; and do not lead to any reduction in national safety 
requirements by setting lower international standards.6 
The specificity of the United Kingdom’s approach, in particular to 
health and safety regulation, must be understood in order to grasp the 
precise significance of those enumerated concerns. On the 
recommendation of an inquiry made into the 1965 Sea Gem disaster, the 
United Kingdom had shifted from a relatively light-touch and essentially 
self-regulatory approach to one characterized by detailed prescriptive 
rules.7 The difficulty involved in producing this level of detail for a 
technologically complex and evolving industry soon became apparent,8 
but the United Kingdom stuck to the task even as it abandoned a similar 
approach to onshore industries.9 The United Kingdom launched another 
inquiry to report on the fitness of its own regulatory regime in the 
aftermath of the Ekofisk blowout—which occurred in the Norwegian 
sector of the North Sea in 1977—but missed the opportunity to remedy 
this problem.10 With the benefit of hindsight, the folly of the United 
Kingdom’s approach in the 1970s and 1980s appears all too evident, but 
it took the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 to lay bare the extent to which the 
detailed prescriptive regulatory regime had become detached from the 
reality of operations on the UKCS. With DECC’s predecessor, the 
Department of Energy,11 being criticized for failing to conduct meaningful 
inspections,12 and the operator, Occidental, being criticized for having a 
superficial attitude to risk mitigation,13 it came as no surprise that Lord 
Cullen’s inquiry recommended sweeping changes. In addition, Lord 
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 7. MINISTRY OF POWER, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE 
ACCIDENT TO THE DRILLING RIG SEA GEM, 1967, Cmnd. 3409. 
 8. It took four years from the publication of the Sea Gem inquiry report to 
pass framework legislation in the form of the Mineral Workings (Offshore 
Installations) Act 1971. The full set of regulations under the Act was not in place 
until 1980. Not insignificantly, the last of these were the Offshore Installations 
(Well Control) Regulations 1980 (SI 1980/1759). 
 9. GREAT BRITAIN COMMITTEE ON SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, SAFETY 
AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, 1972, Cmnd. 5034 (U.K.). 
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Cullen’s skepticism regarding the prescriptive regulatory approach14 and 
his findings on the inadequacies of the industry’s much-vaunted 
emergency response arrangements,15 and the case for wholesale change 
became compelling. The inquiry’s recommendations, accepted in full by 
the government of the day,16 resulted in the transfer of responsibility for 
health and safety offshore from the industry’s sponsoring department to 
the dedicated HSE.17 The United Kingdom abandoned the prescriptive 
regulatory approach in favor of a goal-setting approach more in tune with 
the reforms made in other industries during the 1970s.18 This shift assigned 
the operator, as the creator and manager of risk, the responsibilities of 
identifying the hazards affecting his or her specific installation, assessing 
the related risks, and finally specifying the measures necessary to 
minimize and mitigate those risks. This process would be formally set out 
in a document—the safety case—for each installation, making the case to 
the regulator that the design, construction, and operation of the installation 
were safe.19 Significantly, the workforce would also be involved in the 
preparation of the safety case. The regulator—the HSE—would then either 
accept this case or seek modifications until satisfied. Furthermore, the 
safety case itself would exist as a “living document,” which would be 
updated on an ongoing basis to reflect the changing set of hazards 
confronting the installation and the consequent impact on the risk 
assessment and, by extension, on the range of risk minimization and 
mitigation measures required. Lord Cullen insisted that it was impossible 
to legislate safety,20 and the extent to which this new regime adopted that 
belief is abundantly clear: the onus was no longer on the state to develop 
detailed regulations that guaranteed safe operations contingent on 
compliance. Rather, the onus fell on the individual operator to develop an 
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approach to operations on his or her installation that would ensure the 
safety of the workforce and of the installation itself. 
Therefore, the concerns expressed by the United Kingdom’s 
regulatory authorities in the evidence they presented to the Select 
Committee can be clearly understood as a warning against any knee-jerk 
reaction to the Macondo disaster that ran contrary to the lessons the nation 
had already learned, not least in relation to a regulatory approach avoiding 
as far as possible prescriptive “solutions” handed down by the government 
and placing the key responsibility for hazard identification, risk 
assessment, and risk minimization and mitigation on operators. The net 
effect of the United Kingdom’s approach in this regard would require any 
authority acting in such a prescriptive way to be certain the “solution” 
imposed fits with the existing safety case for each installation, without 
thereby creating hazards or increasing risks as a consequence of its 
interaction with existing specific environmental or infrastructural issues. 
Confirmation that this concern was key in the minds of the United 
Kingdom’s responsible regulatory bodies may be inferred from the 
conclusions drawn in the Memorandum in relation to the likelihood that 
the sequence of events leading up to the Macondo disaster could have 
occurred on the UKCS under the regulatory regime outlined above. 
Insofar as the United States had resisted any temptation to follow the 
United Kingdom and other developed jurisdictions down the road towards 
a risk-based approach to the regulation of health and safety offshore—
away from detailed prescription—and had persisted with a regulator, the 
Minerals Management Service, that performed multiple (potentially 
conflicting) functions in relation to licensing, revenue collection, and 
safety and environmental regulation, the conclusions reached by the 
United Kingdom’s authorities are perhaps unsurprising: 
[T]he Government believes the UK has a rigorous offshore oil and 
gas safety regime, with significant differences in the type and style 
of the legislative requirements and the regulatory/enforcement 
approach compared with the USA. The UK offshore oil and gas 
industry also has a somewhat different safety culture than that in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Here, there is greater workforce engagement 
in safety issues, which is supported by regulatory requirements. 
Whilst it is impossible to say that such a blowout as occurred with 
the Deepwater Horizon could never happen in UK waters, our 
additional and different layers of regulatory protection provides a 
reduced probability that it would.21 
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Nor was the Select Committee itself unpersuaded by this conclusion. 
It opined that “the UK [United Kingdom] has high offshore regulatory 
standards, as exemplified by the Safety Case Regime,” and that the United 
Kingdom’s framework “is based on flexible, goal-setting principles that 
are superior to those under which the Deepwater Horizon operated.”22 
Nevertheless, indications that the Select Committee was not entirely 
convinced by evidence from the industry regarding the implementation of 
the regulatory regime persist. Among its conclusions, the Select 
Committee also noted its concern “that the offshore oil and gas industry is 
responding to disasters, rather than anticipating worst-case scenarios and 
planning for high-consequence, low-probability events.”23 
The seriousness of this problem as identified by the Select Committee is 
perhaps not immediately apparent, but it is submitted that, if this finding is 
correct, it would in fact represent a profound questioning of the United 
Kingdom’s post-Piper Alpha approach to health and safety regulation 
offshore. Indeed, it could be concluded that the regime does not actually 
achieve what is claimed for it. Insofar as a safety case is genuinely a living 
document representing the operator’s understanding at any given time of the 
hazards confronting his or her installation, the assessment of the risk, and an 
account of the risk minimization and mitigation measures, then it would surely 
be impossible for the industry to have adopted a reactive stance rather than an 
anticipatory one. If such a profound questioning of the goal-setting and safety 
case approach is possible, does this indicate that the rejection of the 
prescriptive approach in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster was perhaps 
too hasty? Before any answer to this question is attempted, it is necessary to 
consider in greater detail the nature of the approach to environmental 
regulation that was subject to review by the Select Committee and current on 
the UKCS at the time of the Macondo disaster. 
While the Macondo disaster could be seen in the first instance as a 
failure of safety regulation, the focus thereafter is very much centered on 
its environmental effects. Whereas the United Kingdom’s safety regime 
had been developed substantially in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha 
disaster, the focus in that case on the very considerable loss of life meant 
that little consideration was paid to environmental regulation at that time. 
As mentioned, the environmental regulation of the industry on the UKCS 
derives in no small measure from European Union legislation and the 
range of activities subject to environmental protection regulations is very 
wide indeed. From concern over acoustic disturbances of marine mammals 
stemming from seismic surveys during exploration, to the need to comply 
with a range of provisions relating to atmospheric emissions during 
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operations, to the regulation of well abandonment at decommissioning—
every stage of the lifecycle of a hydrocarbon project requires compliance 
with dozens, if not hundreds, of pages of regulations.24 
While the Select Committee did devote time to environmental 
regulation, its focus markedly emphasized the safety dimension. By 
contrast, the independent review (Maitland Review) of the regulatory 
regime for offshore oil and gas conducted at the request of the Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change had more to say in this regard.25 
In particular, the Maitland Review noted: 
Much of the UK’s offshore environmental regulation regime is 
concerned with preventing or minimising any leakage of 
hydrocarbons during normal operations, and is strongly governed 
by EU regulation in this area. Consequently it is relatively 
prescriptive compared to the safety regime, with less scope or 
encouragement for operator initiatives to innovate or be pro-
active.26 
Accordingly, the Maitland Review explicitly criticized the general 
European Union approach to environmental regulation, insofar as its 
prescriptive nature limits the ability of the operator to identify the best 
solution to hazards and risks affecting the individual installation. That 
observation thus implicitly endorsed the goal-setting and safety case 
approach, which is supposed to have the virtues of ensuring that 
responsibility lies with the creator of risk and providing a framework to 
achieve ongoing hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk 
minimization and mitigation. 
It might, therefore, be concluded that the Select Committee’s concerns 
regarding the safety case approach should not lead blindly back to re-
adoption of a prescriptive approach. On the other hand, the Maitland 
Review made clear that the review panel shared the Select Committee’s 
concerns about the safety case approach, noting that although it viewed 
that regime “as, on the whole, robust and effective at identifying risks and 
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appropriate measures for mitigation and response, it [had] some concerns 
about the processes for confidently assuring that these plans are reliably 
and effectively implemented.”27 
The United Kingdom’s own assessment of its health, safety, and 
environmental regulations at the time of Macondo might, therefore, be 
summarized as follows. Prescription in relation to health and safety has 
been abandoned and no compelling reason appears to justify a return to it. 
Prescription in relation to environmental protection may suffer from the 
same problems that previously beset this approach to safety, but, insofar 
as the United Kingdom is bound by European legislation that is 
characterized by this approach, little room remains for maneuver. The 
preference for the goal-setting and safety case approach should not, 
however, be read as blind faith that this regulatory orientation is inevitably 
superior, since its success depends upon the extent to which it is 
appropriately implemented; evidence of problems in this regard persist. 
This most recent finding by the Select Committee in 2010 and by the 
Maitland Review in 2011 are all the more troubling, as they essentially 
confirm problems identified by the HSE in 2007,28 which should, in 
essence, have been resolved by 2009.29 
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTERVENTION 
If these were the problems confronting the United Kingdom as a 
mature hydrocarbon province, they were nothing compared to those facing 
the European Union’s institutions. Prior to the Macondo disaster, those 
bodies had not displayed a particular interest in the upstream industry 
beyond the application of general environmental and health and safety law, 
as well as a somewhat more direct, but still light, involvement in the 
industry’s health and safety through the Extractive Industries Directive.30 
However, following the Macondo disaster, the interest of European Union 
institutions in the offshore industry increased significantly. Both the 
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European Parliament31 and the European Commission (Commission)32 
indicated in October 2010 that legislative action was necessary at the 
Union level. Initially the suggestion contemplated restricting such action 
to the amendment of the Extractive Industries Directive, but the eventual 
proposal from the Commission contemplated a new regulation.33 
Publication of the proposed regulation provoked consternation in the 
United Kingdom—the largest oil producer in the European Union.34 The 
concern flowed from the fact that the approach to health and safety 
regulation contained in the document was perceived to run counter to that 
adopted in the United Kingdom, despite the pains taken by the 
Commission to suggest that it had drawn inspiration from the best 
practices evident in the United Kingdom and other producing Member 
States. The apprehension was all the more acute in the United Kingdom 
and other experienced producer states because, under European Union 
law, a regulation has direct effect without the need for any transposition 
into domestic law and supersedes contrary Member State law. Member 
States saw this intervention as particularly heavy-handed and feared that 
it might undo years of lessons that were often learned the hard way. 
The strength of the reaction against the proposal, as well as the number 
of identified problems suggesting a lack of understanding of the industry, 
may have persuaded the Commission that legislating by way of a directive 
would be more appropriate. In contrast to a regulation, a directive under 
European Union law requires action from the Member States to implement 
its requirements through domestic law. A directive also offers Member 
States more freedom of action, with the emphasis being on the 
achievement of the overall objective rather than on the means of 
achievement. Therefore, industry leaders and regulators in countries such 
as the United Kingdom greeted the replacement of the proposed regulation 
with a draft directive with some relief. A close reading of the eventual 
Offshore Safety Directive (OSD)35 suggests, however, that the impact will 
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 32. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
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had significance for the EEA. 
 35. Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
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still be significant, especially in terms of regulatory architecture. Thus, the 
Commission’s concern in eliminating conflicts of interest between 
economic development on the one hand, and health, safety, and 
environmental regulation on the other,36 meant that DECC could not retain 
both its licensing and environmental regulatory responsibilities. 
This requirement in the OSD could have posed a tricky problem for the 
United Kingdom had it not been for the fortuitous intervention of Sir Ian 
Wood’s Review (Wood Review), published in early 2014 and dealing with 
the maximization of the economic recovery of hydrocarbons.37 The 
incumbent-Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change commissioned 
the review, soliciting from Wood—a respected member of the oil and gas 
industry—his views on which reforms of the United Kingdom’s licensing and 
regulatory regime were necessary to ensure, as the country entered the late 
stages of maturity as a hydrocarbon province, that as much of its oil and gas 
resources as possible would be extracted before cessation of production. 
Among his recommendations, Wood proposed that the licensing function 
currently performed by DECC should be taken over by a new independent, 
arm’s-length regulator with novel and enhanced powers to direct the industry 
and to overcome commercial behaviors that, though in the interest of 
individual licensees and their co-venturers, were not conducive to maximizing 
the economic recovery of the nation’s hydrocarbon resources. Acceptance of 
these recommendations led to the formation of the Oil and Gas Authority 
(OGA),38 which will assume the licensing duties currently borne by DECC. 
The net effect of this change eliminates the potential conflict of interest within 
DECC between licensing and environmental regulation. As will be seen in 
due course, however, it is still unknown whether this apparently neutral 
institutional change will raise issues of relevance for health, safety, and the 
environment. 
A further complication arises from the fact that the OSD calls for 
health, safety, and environmental risks to be considered together. Whereas 
the United Kingdom, after the Piper Alpha disaster, moved to separate the 
regulation of health and safety from the licensing function, the regulation 
of environmental protection was not similarly affected. Therefore, while 
the safety case focuses on the identification of hazards affecting health and 
safety, thereafter seeking to quantify risks to health and safety and 
detailing the employment of measures to reduce those risks to a level as 
low as reasonably practicable, the equivalent document in the OSD—the 
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Major Hazard Report—calls for simultaneous consideration of health and 
safety hazards and environmental hazards, followed by appropriate risk 
assessment and management. These requirements, transposed into British law 
by new regulations,39 replace the existing Safety Case Regulations of 2005. 
While operators may find it relatively straightforward to adapt to the 
new approach—not least because many oil companies already unify 
health, safety and environmental functions within one department—the 
question arises as to how the review and acceptance of the new safety case 
will be achieved at the level of the regulator, since the HSE claims no 
expertise in environmental matters and DECC claims none in relation to 
health and safety. The OSD itself provides only that a competent authority 
will perform the role and leaves open the possibility that more than one 
regulatory body comprise that authority. The United Kingdom’s approach 
in this regard has been to create a specific regulator responsible for the 
implementation of the OSD, the Offshore Safety Directive Regulator 
(OSDR), which is “a partnership between HSE’s Energy Division and 
DECC’s Offshore Oil and Gas Environment and Decommissioning 
Team.”40 This administrative scheme is of course, possible, because of the 
transfer of licensing functions away from DECC to the OGA. The OSDR 
stresses that the two bodies, DECC and HSE, “already work closely 
together under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for liaison 
between the two organizations and their regimes,” though it also 
acknowledges that “existing arrangements need to be expanded to comply 
with the requirements of the [OSD].”41 Given that DECC and the HSE 
have collaborated successfully onshore in relation to the implementation 
of European Union legislation relating to the control of major accident 
hazards (COMAH),42 there is surely every reason to be optimistic that the 
new arrangement offshore will not give rise to any undue complications, 
and it may indeed produce a more integrated appraisal of health, safety 
and environmental hazards and risks. 
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HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/authority.htm 
[perma.cc/Q4TR-3UZ2](last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 





This article opened with two questions relating to the impact of the 
European Union’s intervention in the regulation of health and safety and 
environmental protection in the offshore oil and gas industry in the 
aftermath of the Macondo disaster. First, in attempting to ensure that the 
risks of a Macondo-style disaster in the waters of the European Union are 
minimized, have that organization’s institutions unnecessarily 
complicated the United Kingdom’s arrangements? Second, where the 
European Union’s intervention has followed the United Kingdom’s 
existing approach, has it inadvertently compelled the wider adoption 
among Member States of an approach to regulation about which questions 
may legitimately be raised? 
Given the extent to which the Commission’s initial proposals were 
modified in the face of significant criticism, and given that the key impact 
on regulatory architecture in the United Kingdom has been to bring DECC 
and the HSE together as the OSDR, in a manner substantially mirroring 
their existing COMAH cooperation, good reasons surely support 
answering the first question in the negative. Of course, it is worth bearing 
in mind that this solution was only made possible by the fortuitous 
establishment of the OGA and the transfer to it of DECC’s licensing 
function. What would have happened should the Wood Review not have 
occurred, or should Wood have come up with different recommendations 
in relation to licensing, remains an open question? 
The second question is not so easy to answer. Certainly substantial 
grounds exist supporting the widespread view in the United Kingdom that 
its goal-setting and safety case regime does indeed constitute best practice 
and offers, in principle, significant advantages over a detailed prescriptive 
approach to regulation. Accordingly, very good reasons justify the 
conclusion that the adoption of this approach throughout the European 
Union should be welcomed and that Member States who may be in an 
earlier phase of offshore development—(of which there are a number in 
the Mediterranean and Black Seas)—will therefore benefit from the 
experience gained by countries such as the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, the nagging questions about the extent to which the safety case, as a 
paper exercise, reflects and/or affects physical operations remain. These 
questions were previously raised by the HSE in 2007 and, despite 
reassurances that they had been addressed in 2009, their re-emergence in 
the conclusions of both the Select Committee Review and the Maitland 
Review in 2010 and 2011, respectively, is striking. Is there a risk, then, 
that the Commission, in compelling the European Union-wide adoption of 
this approach, has thereby spread not best practice, but rather a practice 




that, despite its advantages over prescriptive regulation, appears to contain 
a weakness that has not yet been convincingly addressed? 
If that risk does indeed exist, then it is surely one that will only be 
exacerbated by the current low price environment that has seen the 
industry, as in previous downturns, cutting costs aggressively. While the 
safety case should, as a living document, prevent cost-cutting that 
increases safety risks, the HSE’s 2007 findings suggest that this effect did 
not occur during earlier low price situations. If this scenario poses 
potential problems for any state with an offshore industry, it does so all 
the more for the United Kingdom, which, fifty years after the award of its 
first license, now sees much of its offshore infrastructure characterized as 
“aging assets.” With the advent of the new (and newly-empowered) 
regulator through the OGA, the circumstances potentially place operators 
at the center of a maelstrom of competing pressures. From one direction, 
the operators may face pressures to cease production and decommission 
due to the maturity of the reservoir and the low price environment. From 
another, they may see unprecedented demands from the OGA to retain 
infrastructure and collaborate with other joint ventures—and invest 
accordingly—in the wider interests of the state, irrespective of what their 
individual commercial decision might have been. From yet another 
direction, operators may face pressures from the OSDR either to invest to 
ensure ongoing safe and clean operation or to decommission aging assets. 
Thus, the energy trilemma between energy security, economic 
development and environmental protection, though a macro-level global 
problem, thus also exists in an acute form at the micro-level of individual 
offshore installations in a mature hydrocarbon province such as the UKCS. 
The European Union’s interventions were no doubt well intentioned, and 
they may have many benign effects. One nevertheless may wonder 
whether, in reacting to the specific circumstances of the Macondo disaster, 
the European Union missed the opportunity to resolve the problem that 
could have had the greatest impact on ensuring that offshore oil and gas 
operations would be safe and clean in the most complex situations, 
including those characterized by competing political, economic, and 
environmental pressures. This goal could perhaps be better served by 
focusing attention not on the widespread deployment of the safety case 
approach, but rather on ensuring that, once deployed, implementation 
occurs in such a way as to actually reflect and affect physical operations.43 
                                                                                                             
 43. This point was made by the author in the May 20, 2011 submission produced 
by a Working Group of the IBA’s Oil and Gas Committee and Environment, Health, 
and Safety Law Committee in response to the European Commission’s Public 
Consultation on Offshore Safety launched on March 16, 2011. 
